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costless,  taxpayers  may prefer  some randomness  when the  increased revenue  can 
be rebated,  so  that  the  government  a  revenue  stays fIxed.  These  results do 
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February  1988 1.  ft4TRODUCTION 
her  tax reporting is  voLntary as in the U.S. income tax system, enforcement 
o  tre tax code is undertaKen  primarily trrough occasional audits, with penal— 
t4es often assessea "  t"e taxpayer is Qiscoverea to nave ndereported taxao'e 
ncome,  Most  studies of optmal tax enforcement focus on the frequency ov au- 
dits  ard tre penalty  for evasIon.  This paper discusses  anotrer aspect of  the 
tax system  enat affects  underreporting:  that taxable  ircome as it would  be 
assessed by  an auditor is a random variable, since the tax code  is i'—defined 
in  ts details and pecause  there  is randomness  in the  juogmen: f  aotors 
The tax  administration  agency  can reduce randomness by issung cetaied  regu— 
'ations or cy training auditors more unirormly.z We investjgate  tc.  wrat  extent 
we'are is ennanced by eliminating  randomness in tax liability assessment.  We 
nd  trat, wren reducing  randomness  is costly,3 it is not optima to remove al' 
ee (1987)  reports that,  although  taxpayers have the right to  ask,  the  RS 
for binding decisions on tax issues, these decisions have no eievance or 
other taxpayers,  and the egai  fees involved are often in the neighbo—nood 
of  $10,000.  We assume trat, due to  costliress,  taxpayers do not often taKe 
auvantage  of this. 
Randomness  could also be reduced by  changing the tax law  itself.  Por ex- 
ample,  the U.S.  Treasury  Department's tax  reform proposal  of Novemper, 
1984, Tax  Reform  for Fai,Simplicity, and  Economic Growth,  stressed 
the  rnportance  of simplifying  tre  tax code,  it further recognized  tnat 
simplicity  in taxation  has several dimensions,  among  them that  'under  a 
simple  system, most  responsible  taxpayers  would  be more certain  of their 
tax liapilities."  If the tax code  is truly  unclear  in  its details,  then 
an  ex post appeal to the Tax Court  is just another lottery (a'though  it s 
better  to have two chances  for a victory  than one).  Stil  ,  tre decision 
of  the Tax Court is unpredictable. 
One could  imagine circumstances  in which  reducing  variability  in  assess— randomneos  4n  tax  14aoiiity assessmento.  A1so. the enoroemert ageroys pre- 
ferred amourt of randomress differs aooordirc  to  wretrer tre enforcement oolicy 
:  chosen  to maximize revenue on  to raxmze  we'are. 
Our  model  is  consistent  with two characterizations  o' auditors1  motives. 
The 'inst  is that each  auditor enforces toe  1aw to the  cast  of  h4s  on  hen 
ability,  but  some tax  issues a—a unoeroaim.  The  second  is that, wh4le  some 
adtors  favor  the Treasury  and others  favor  toe taxpayer,  the assignment  o' 
auditors to taxpayers  is random. 
Seot4or 2  below  snows  4r  a  smple model that with tre orooacilty of audit 
ard fres  f1xed, re-oo—reoo  assessed taxable  4oome genera  ly e"ba'oes  re- 
venue." Seotio  S crows tat  optimality  repuires  some randorress  whenever  re— 
dong  rardooness  s oost'y.5 A mammal mo—ease in randomress, from an mnita' 
point  of  rome,  imposes no loss  in  expected  utility and does  not ohange  the 
amont —f reven,e collected.  Hence, it is socially desirable to save costs by 
a1ow4ng sore raroomness in tax liability assessments, and to rebate the savings 
to taxpayers.  Since this is  true for every tax rate,  it  'ollows that the optimal 
rombnat'on of  tax code  and enforcement pocy  reouras some  a—oomress. 
ments  is not oostiy,  and our ana'ysis  does  rot apply ther,  For example, 
it may  cc that, wh4ie  clarifying  the tax code  is  costly,  the  increased 
clarity recuces the cost of training auoitors, and or net saves costs. 
'  This  corroborates  the intuit1or of Roberts  (1979)  who argued  that  uncer- 
tainty of  true tax liability ensures conservative decision making by risk— 
ave—se agents, and may therefore be preferable to  the alternative  of having 
explicit rules fo— esery possible situation. 
The  argument  is  smiiar  to  Baidry1s  (1984)  argumemt  that  complete 
erforoemert  of income  tax  laws, designed  to reduce  inoome tax evasion  to 
zero,  is  inefficient when the marginal cost of enforcemert s  positive.' Secton 4 discusses the optimal amount  of randomness with two ceent  as— 
StOt O'5 aDout tne available  policy instruments.  First, we discuss  the  act 
that a 'xed amount  of revenue can ce col1ected  with high frequency of audits 
arc  tte  randomress, or with low fequency of  audits arc high  randomness, when 
tax ad 'e  —ates are fxed.  Since costs can be saved by ircreasng randomness 
arc dec—easng the probabilty of ajdt,  the cost—rninimiz'rg  poi4cy  equires 
as -nc  randornress  as possible.  Witn  savese taxpayers, ore therefore r1ght 
suspect that the cost—minimizing  enForcement  policy does nct maxiTize raxoajer 
we1fare,  eden if the cost—savings  are  renated through tax —eductions.  This 
deoends  on  now  fast  the  probaDiity  of  audit  can  as  ardcmess 
—creases.  ih Section  4 we a1so  d4scjss the second—best pooem  tnat one acit 
bdget  is  neld  fixed and acdtional revenues coected due to rarcomness  are 
eoated to taxpayers  (possibly as an increase  in  public servces)  Taxcayers 
ray orefer  some randomness  n  tax assessments  even if reducing  rardotness is 
Our earlier  paper  (1987)  gives  examples to show that  optma  enforcement 
may or  may  not require a  trivially  small  probability  of audit,  and infi- 
nitely  high variance  in assessed  ncome. 
We  assume  that the increased revenue is returned to  taxpayers as  a  lump sum 
rebate,  rather  than as a  owered tax  rate.  This  simp'cation nas been 
used Frequently  in the literature.  See, for example, Slenrod and Yitznaki 
(:987) and lowell (1985).  There are two Oifferences  between  lowering the 
tax  rate and making  lump—sum rebates  or inc—easing  puolc  goods.  Djrst, 
the lump—sum reDate does not deperd or wnether the  taxcayer  is  aditeo or 
the amount of  taxable ircome he  is assessed.  The benefit of a reOceO tax 
rate depends  on whether the taxpayer is audited.  Seconc, 1umo—sum recates 
and  reduced  tax  rates  have slightly  aifferent  impacts on the taxpayers 
reported ncome, 
3 costless.! keoates mignt smooth oorsnotThr  oetw—r  tst  i  one wolO Hr wrio 
one taxoayer  is and is not auoiteo, nus  providThc a oreft.9 
2.  UNCERTAINTY  AND REVENUE 
We  assume  that,  conditional  on  audit,  the auditor may assess one of  two in- 
comes, r—d or md, as the tasabie income, each with  pobaoi14ty ore"bal.  The 
pr'areter  m  is  not true taxab'e  income; ratner,  it s  '-erely  the mear of a 
oistr'bution of possh'e assessed roomes.  Since different auditors wou1O as- 
sess dfeant  taxable ncome, rrnest  "epo"ting nas no nearrg,  and  4t  -5  im— 
possio'e  for  the texoayer to take a  riskiess position.  1' -e or she reported 
the maxrum  roome  in  the  support of possible  assessed  incomes, which  is md 
our  simple model,  he or she would  avoid  fines,  but would  often fno when 
audted  that 'true taxable ncome' was overeported  and a rebate is forthcoming. 
But we show  in our earl1er  paper  (1967)  that  in thjs  req4me  tne  optimal 
varanoe :n assessed  income is f4nite. 
That  expected  uti4ty may  increase wth uncertainty even when there  is no 
cost  saving is reminiscent of  the results of  Weiss (1976), Stiglitz (1992) 
and  Chang  and W4ldasHn  (1997). who  found  that  when  taxation  introduces 
distortions  to the  'abor market,  randomness  in  tax  liability may  impove 
welfare.  The welfare benefit  of increased  'abor  supply  may outweigh  the 
welfare  loss of i"creesed  uncertainty.  This mechanism  is absent  in  our 
rode 
4 We assume  a  linear tax rate  t,  and  trat  fines  are  eved at  rate  or 
unreported  tax  liability  when  an  audit  reveals  tnat  ircorne  ras  ceer 
underreported.  The probability  of audit is p. 
f tre  taxpayer is assessed  higher taxable income than reported, he or sne 
says tre tax due on assessed income plus a  fine on the unreported  income.  If 
the taxpayer  is  assessed  lower taxable income than reporteo,  r'e  or sne s  re— 
oatea try overpaid tax, but is not rebated a  reward' at  the fine rate.  We  shall 
use the  notation wNA, WAL, w  to refer  to the net incomes availaole  to  the 
taxpayer  in  the  case of no audit, audit with a low assessment,  rn—d, and audit 
witn  a  ngh assessment,  m+d.  Letting  y  be  the  taxpayers  gross  income, 
NA_1t  wA=y t(in+d) tf(m+dr), and 
wAL=  y-t(m-d) or 
WAL_ yt(flid)(mdr), 
accod1rg  to  whether  reported  income  r  is  greater or less than m—d.  When 
r<md, WAH<WAL<WNA.  When r>m-d, W,<WNA<WAL. 
Since the taxpayer's  reported income will typically depend  or'  d  as well  as 
on the  procability  of audit and fine rate, the amount of revenue coi1ected will 
a so depend  on d.  We snow that when taxpayers have nonincreasing absolute risk 
avers'or,5 reportec income rises with  d, and therefore  the amount of evenue 
cc Jectec  rises  with  a also.  Taxpayers  choose  reported  income  r(d,p,t)  to 
maximize  expected utility,  knowing that an audit  is possible.  The optmai '-e— 
Decreasing  absolute risk aversion  implies that in the choice cetween a safe 
asset  and a  risky asset,  the risky asset is a normal good.  Therefore de- 
creasing absolute risk aversion  is often  taken as a  reasonable  assumption 
about  preferences.  However,  when  assessed  income  is  a  random  va'iaDle, 
trere is no safe asset. 
S port  r(d,p,t),  which  is  less  tnan  od,51  maximizes  exoected  utility, 
EU[r.d,p,ti,  Expected  utility  is  a concave  function of  r,  provided  U['  is 
concave.  12 
(1)  EU[r,d,p,t]  = (1p)U{wNA] 
+ (p/2)U[wAL]  (p/2)U[wAH] 
where we must substitute the correct expression  for 
wAL  according to to  whether 
r is less than or greeter then m—d, 
The expected revenue collected  is just the taxpayers expected payment: 
(2)  R[r(),d,p,t]  = t[I—p(i+f)] r() + m  pt('u+f)  if r(') < m—d 
(3)  R[r(),d,p,t]  = tjI—(p/2)(2f)]  r() + m  t(p/2)(2f)  (p/2)tfd 
if  r(') ￿  mn—d 
' A  report  of  m±d always dominates e larger  report, because we assume  fines 
cannot  be negative.  Reporting  income  greeter then m+d increeses taxes when 
the texpeyer is not audited, and has no advantage when the texpeyer is au- 
dited.  We allow  the texpeyer to report  negetive  income.  As one can see 
from the  first—order  conditions  (4) end  (5) below,  the texpeyer  will  not 
do so if it forces income in the state of the world that he  is audited and 
assessed high to be  close to zero, provided the merginel utility of income 
goes to infinity as income goes to zero. 
' The  function  EU(r)  (with  the  peremeters  d  p  and t  fixed) is the minimum 
of  the  two  functions  f(r)  (1—p)U(m—tr)  +(p/2)U(m—t(m—d)—tf(m—d—r)) 
end  g(r)  (1-p)U(m-tr)+  (p/2)U(m-t(m-dfl+ 
(p/2)U(m—t(m±d)tf(m±dr)).  Thet is,  EU(r)min(f(r),g(r)}.  A  function 
that is the minimum of  two concave functions is conoeve. 
6 o  snow trat revenue increases with d,  we must characterize the optimal 'e— 
Oort r().  The optimal report r(.) satisfies (4) or (5),  according to wetrer 
r(.) is smaller or  larger than m—d.13 
4)  -(-P)U[wNA] 
+ (p/2)f U'[wAL] 
+ (p/2)f U[wAN]  ￿  0,  = 0  f r(.) < m-d 
(5)  —(1—c)  + (p/2)f  U[wAH] 
=  0  f  m—d  r() < 
if r()  = m—d 
if r(.)  m+d 
Proposition  1:  Suppose  creferences  exhibit  nonincreasing  absolute  risk 
aversion ard p￿1/(i+f).  Then,  if >D  and r(')<m—d or  reverue 
nc"eases with d.  If d=0, a marginal  increase in d  does  not afect revenue. 
Proof:  We  discuss  this  seoarately  for  the  domains  on wh;ch  r(.)<rn—d, 
r()=m—d, m—d<r()<m+d and r()=m+d.  Fi"st  suppose that r()<m—a, wnich  can 
orly occur i  p<1/(i+f).  Differentiating  (4) implctly, 
Since  excected  utility  is  a  concave  functon of  r,  the dervative is 
000increasing.  It follows that  the r(.) wnich  satisfies (4) and (5)  s 
unique. 
If o=i  and  honestly reporting rm  is therefore equiva'ent to noding a safe 
asset), the taxpayer will report r<m when p<1/(1+f),  because  the expected 
return  to  underreporting  income is positive.  If p1/(1±f), the taxpayer 
will  prefer to  report  rm,  Since  probability  of  audit  1/(1f)  makes 
unoereporting income at d0  a  fair bet&,  it is reasonacle  to restrict p 
to be less than 1/(1+f). 
There may be an interval of  values on which  r(.)m—d, althougn  or d  suf- 
ficiently  large, m—d<r(),  At  rrr—d,  the marginal  utility of increasing  r 
jumps  down  Oiscontinuousiy  by the amount (pf/2)U[y—t(m—d)].  The optimal 
'eport  r(•) equals  m—d  if these  marginal  utilities  are on opposite  sides 
of zero.  For some values of d,  a  marginal  increase in d will preserve the 
jump  at r()m—d.  If p<1/(1f), then revenue decreases with d on an in- 
terval where  r(.)m-0. 
7 (p/2)f(lf) [U"[wAHj-b"[wA]] 
(6)  nfl  =  ________  ______________________—  if n(s) < m—d 
(l-p)U"{wNA] 
÷ (p/2)f2[U"[wAH]+U'[wA]] 
Reported  income and revenue  incnease with  d as long as the second derivative 
of utility is increasing, as  with ncninoneasing absolute risk aversion. 
Suppose  next trat m—d<r()<m+d.  Differentiating  (5) impiioitly,  the  re- 
sponsiveness  of  reported  inoome  to randomness  is given  by the following  ex- 
pression. 
(p/flf(i+f)U"[wAH] 
(7)  rd()  =  if m—d < r(') < m÷d 
(i-p) bIwNA] 
+ (r/2)f2  b[wAH] 
This expression  is always  positive,  and according  to  (3),  revenue  rises witfl 
d.  IG 
On  an interval of values d for which  r(*)m+d, the derivative of revenue, 
epuation  (3), with respect to d  s positive.  If  p<l/(i+f),  then  at d0, 
r(e)cm—d and an incremental amount  of uncertainty will affect neither reported 
income  ncr  revenue,  according  tc epuaticns  (2) and  (6),  since  wAH=wAL. 
If 
p=1/(i+f),  then r()m-d  in a  neigrdcrhood of dD,  according to the  following 
Lemma,  and an increase  to d will  reduce  reported income.  But this will not 
affect  revenue, since,  substituting r(D,p,t)m—d into revenue function  (2) or 
(3), the derivative  of  revenue is [i_p(itf)]rd(*)D.  0,50. 
G If p￿i/(i+f),  then {i—(p/2)(2±f)]  is nonnegative. ana :  (ADperdix).  If p1,(1+f) and util1tg exn'oits noninc'easing ao— 
so:ute 'tsR  aversion, then  r(d,p,t)am—d for d 4n a neigroor'rnod of O. 
The 1ntttion behind  Proposition 1 is  best 511fl by  analogy to  a  probtem of 
oortfol4o cnoice.  Allingham and  Sandmo's (1972) paper irtroduced this  frareewor 
'or tne case  tnat  Utru?  taxable Income is defined.  In  tnat case, understating 
1rcome 's equ1vaent to purchasing  a r1sPj asset which  pays  off in the event 
vie 'etjrn  's unaad4ted  and suffers a 'oss in the  event  that  an aidit  occurs. 
dnen  there  is randomness  in assessed taxable 'ncome, the  taxpaye' is  "1  essence 
'orced to hold a risky asset regardless of the  reported  income.  T"e amount of 
rcome reported  generates anotne  risky asset,  whose va1ae to  the taxpayer de- 
pends  on the extent of  randomness  in  assessment.  In other words,  one  must 
consider  the  covariance  between tne involuntarily held random—assessment  asset 
ara the asset  created by the "corn.  report. 
Conrde  'i"st vie case wne'e the  opt'mal report is greater tnan the 1j 
assessed  ncome  (rn'rd).  ror given r, an 1rc'ease  1n  d  reduces  net  "tome  in 
vie  a4'ted,  "igi' assessment  state o'  the wor d.  riis  increases vie  state— 
contingent  'uvarginal  utility of increasing r.  An  increase  in  a iso 4ncreases 
net  'ncome in the audited, 1ow assessment  stats of the world, but  income 'n this 
state  1s not affected by r,  since  the  taxpajer ¶s  simp'y 'iaoie  for t(m—d), 
regaraless of reported income.  Overall, an  increase in  d increases the marginal 
utility  of Increasing  r 1n the  aud'ted, nign—assessment  state of the world and 
leaves  it .anchanged in the other  states.  the'efore,  the optimal report  in- 
creases when  d  increases. 
dhen the optimal  report  is less than the  low  assessed  income, an  'ncrease 
in d alters the riskiness of the taxpayer's portfolio  by  2ecreasing income  ip 
9 toe worst  state of the  world (audted,  hich  assessrrnt) art roeasrg -ccme 
c  tre sate arourt  :r tre  seoorc—best  state o  the world (audited,  'ow assess— 
mert).  Thic affects  the state—contffge"t margna' utilty o' ncreas4nc 
both  audited  states of the world.  An irorease ir r ircreases 1roome  in these 
two states  oetica''y.  As long  as the  seoord de—  ,at'ie of utflity  is  in- 
creasing,  s wtb nonincreasing  absolute  rsk  aversion,  the  c"eese in tre 
marg4ral  uti'ity of r n the  high assessment  state outweighs  the deorease  in 
the -arral uti'  ity of r. 
Ir both oases, being foroed to rolc mo—a  of the rardom—assessmert asset makes 
the repotec—incore  asset tore attaotve.  Toe  reporbed-roome  a_oct pays 0ff 
in  the  aud4teb,  high  assessmert  otate  cc  the wor'o,  r  wr4o  tre  margins1 
utYity of  income  iroreases  with  d  rses. 
Prooostion  1  mp' 'es that the Treasury can  ncrease —evene  simply by aserg 
its auotors  to  introduce  randomness by flipping coins.  Such  a  policy  coulo 
probaoly  not persot cecause  randomness that contradicts tne tax code  could  be 
successful 'y appealed  to  lay  Court.  Furtberrore, a  rat—revenue—max'rnZ'ng  tax 
coi'ecion  agency  would  always  prefer  to  4orease randoTess  by  layirg off 
merbes of fts auctctaining c—  regulation—writing  stafl.  a"d  thereby  save 
costs.  But  even  so,  tre obse'vatic  tha revenue  oar  be  i-creased  costiessly 
by  rtroducirg  rardomress renf—ces one of the main  ports of tois  caper; that 
croosirg ar  enforcanet policy  to maxmize reverue  does  not  necessarily  serve 
toe  public  inte'est.  The  revenue—aximiz4ng  erffrcemert policy  is  not  the 
we1 fara—maxirizing policy.  We  now  consider  how much  rardcmness  is  optimal. 
10 3.  SOME RANDOMNESS  IS OPTIMAL 
We now argue that, wnsn clarifying the tax cods  4s costlj, son randomness 
is optima'  irrespective of now  or why the other tax and enforcement  parameters 
are selected.  This is because a marginal  Increase in d from daO  saves costs 
without reducing  expected utilit; or increasing revenue. 
ins following Lena is required: 
emma  2:  At  d0,  and  proiided  ps1/(1+),'  the  deriiative  of 
EU(r(d,p.t),d,p,t]  with  respect to d 4s zero.  That  is, a  marginal increase 'n 
randomress does  not  decrease  expected utility. 
Proof:  Suppose  'irst that p'1/(14f),  so that taxpayers  report r(O,p,t$m 
wnen d0.  The part;a1 derivat've  witn respect to  r is zero  because 0' tne 
taxpayer's optimizing  cnotce.  Therefore we on1y  need  to show  that the partial 
with respect to d is  zero.  The derivat4ve with respect to d 45 
(p12) t(1+f) [ U'(wAL] 
— U'[wM]  ], which is zero  when  wALaw. 
For te  case that rl/(1'f), we again  need Lena 1, trat r(d,p,t)rd  for 
small d.  Substituting  r(a,p,t)m—d  into expected utility, it  becomes 
17  For ourposes of  Proposition 2  we do  not need  to  consider p1  (1+'),  becadse, 
if d0,  the optimal (d,p,t) would  require p￿1/(1&f).  Probability r1/(1f) 
e'icits truthful reporting,  and a nigner  probability wobid  oe  wasteful. 
11 '1—oUy—tfr—c  ] 
—  'p'Z' d(y—t(u—d,  fo  .  [g—tt+j—2tcf].  rrg tre 'acts 
that  pi/'1fj ard  wAL=WMN*.  tr  aer'Vat'vP 4tr respect to C at dO  2cm. 
O.E.D. 
!qpositior__2:  Suppose  that  the margina  cost of reducrg  rardorness  '5 
positive.  so tnat  increasing  randomness saves costs.  Ter d0 i  not cptin. 
ggf:  he  showed in  Drcpcsitlor  1 and  era  2 t'iat at cC.  a costless raP— 
gina:  iicrease  in randomress  coes not  charge reierue  or  cecrease  expectea 
utility.  That 's, tte partial de—4vative  of  EU(r(').d,p,t] with  respect to C 
'5  zero.  're costs saved cy increa:1g  d  can  be rebated to  tie taxpager, e'ther 
as a  t.p—sam  rebate or a Teouctior  "  the  tax rate.  '4 wnich  'rcrease 
expectec utitty.  C E.. 
S'nce tI"s 's trie  9—" all  tax rates t anc probabilit'es of audit  p' it  im- 
plies t.a  tne .,ptita'  coettnation  (t,p,d) requires d>O wneneve' reducing "ar— 
dcaress 's  ..c,tj.  It is  optimal to  increase raqdowress unt4' the inargisal  loss 
in exrected titirtj is just balanced  bg the  cost—savtg. 
4.  THE OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF UNCERTAINTY 
Here  we d'  sct.ss  two  secord—best  probems reating to the  opt4nal  amount o 
rardo—ness.  The 9rst is the  probec of erfcrce'nert, with a  fixed tax  code. 
Since rsvents typ'cafly —ises with  the prooab'1't.,  c' aucit and  typicaiy  rises 
with raroomness  (at 'east  for large enough  a)1 tnee ae  nary co'tinations  of p and 0 cnc  w4'  coreot a  ixec armt  revee.  noe raising 0  arc re_ 
ducmg p  saves  cost, toe oost—nin'r.:"g  enrorcement  pu'  'cy reore5 a  cun 
randomness  as possible, wish  soaU orooaoil4ty  of audit. 
But raroomness (d larger tar zero) reducas expected uti1ity oy roosing cx 
ante  unoerta4rty.  Wnether or rot 'r'r'te variance "  assessed  tax '4abYity 
—aximizes  taxcayen ee1are, as ecU as rnmizng  the erforce'nent  cost, deoeros 
on how  asc expecteo t4'cy  a1's  etn uncertainty,  re1ative  to  tne  cost 
savings.  Our  o.ev:os caper  (:987) g1ves two examples, shoeing tnat tis  nay 
go e(tker way. 
We rotica coat tre oscon of whether  incirte  varance  is  the  ooclmal 
enforcement  oo4cy s sT'  'ar to the question of  whether 4t is oot'na' to in- 
crease 'res wchout b"o,  wren toe  two erorcement parameters  are  the a.ne 
rate and aud4t  prooao:'  it]  rather  trar .,rcertainty  ano audit orooaoY  4c1  as 
here.  In the tradeo  oetween arct—pruoat1nty and f1nes (witn no ranoonress), 
revenue  in  amount  tm can aways  be co'Thctad  by cnoosirg pV)  (I—f),  s'rce 
taxpayers then report 4rcome m  (underreporting  income is then a  ar  oet  ) 
Enforcement  costs  can  a'ways be red.ced witrout any loss to taxpayer t4'4ty, 
oy cnoosing f larger and p(f) smaller (but never o.'te zero).  T'us,  trere  is 
no  conf1ict  between tne goals  of m4nimizirg  enforcement  cost and max''rcng 
taxoayer uti'ity, provided the tax rate has oeen set sucr that  tm is eoua'  to 
tne  revenue  requirement.  in  cortrast,  honest repotng' cannot  elim4nate 
' If there is a" upper bound  or  the feasible d because negative income is not 
allowed, then toe cost—mr'mlzing  amourt o' uncertainty m'ght be  tne lowest 
value a for wnok r(.)rn—d  Tn's 4s oecause, wnen p<l/(l), revenue de- 
creases witr c or the do—a4r were r(e)an_d.  :ncreases ,r d on that comain 
save costs, but oecrease  revenue, necessitating  a s'multaneous increase in 
the probati' ty  of  aucit,  ratrer trar decrease 
13 variance in incore wren  taxable  income is rando'  If the  taxpave' •epo'ts  m, 
ne  will  nave  cffsrert net 4rcome according to cethe'  c is  assesse nigh o 
low wnen audited. 
Another second—best probn Is rether taxpajers ray prefe' sore rarorrness 
In assessed  taxaDle income when revenues are returned to taxpayers as a  ..ro—sa 
rebate.  In this p'ooe'r, all  otne' tax and  enorcee't carameters ae red 
V  xed.  wni  le aaditi  o-al  revere col ectec  through  'andomness  4 ret  .red to 
taxpayers,  to keep  tneir nan ret—of—tax  4n:one '4xed. 
W.  assume  the goverrrert  keeps tne arcet of revenue roflected  wter C.  A 
sp—sum rebate  4n  a'rount 7(d)"  4s retur cc.° 
$  1(d) —  R(—(•),d.p,tj  — q(—(.),3,; t 
Prooosition  showed that  when a1ow4ng  'ardom'iess  saves costs,  tascpajns 
wir  always  orefer  some uncertairty  to  nore.  The following example  shows  tPat 
taxpayers ray prefer  rardomress  'n tax assessnent  when there '5 i' cost 
' This means that  m  is  augmertec bg T(d)  in  the expressions wMt  wM  arc  wA.. 
For example, wMam+T(d)_trf.). 
The  arguments  to  the ootimal function r(') must  be  augmented to include the 
rebate  1, as in r(d,T,p,t),  since th. amount of  taxable income wifl typ4— 
cally depend on how rich the taxpayer is.  The  taxpayer  does  not  account 
for the effect  on lump—sin transfers  of  changing his  reported income.  He 
takes  income m+T(d)  as  fixed and is not  taxed  on his rebate T(a.  ,j.st as 
i  it  were  a  government  expenditure or public goods.  1(d) 't the  1ap—st.m 
rebate  that balances the budget  on average.  If there are  a  arge  number 
of identical taxpayers. then the budget will be  close to  balanced with  high 
probab'litg, and  each taxpayer  will realize that  the  effect  on 1(d) of  his 
personal evasior decision is  small. 
14 saving, altnobgP this Is not general'y true.  'c r1s* averse taswajer' ￿— 
taste  for uncertainty ny  (or may not) be  aoatinated y  the fact t"at  4n:—eaed 
revenues  may  smooth  consumption over  different  states of  the wor1d. 
An increase  in  randomness,  d,  Increases  expected .at4'ity  4n the 'o"ow4ng 
aaount.  beg'nni'ig  at  a vaue  of d 'or  n'cn  r(.)Cm—d. (We  suporess the a.— 
ments p and t, sInce they 'erai 'txed 'or the remainoer of tr4s  sect'on.) 
dEU(r('),T(d),d 
(9)  ((1—p)J'w,] +  (p/2) (U'EWAL]+b'(wAa]] T'(d) 
do 
— (p/2) t(1.f) [uLwM]bEwb.d,J 
SLbstitutlng  tor u'(WM] 
'ron  tI'e  'irstorOer cordition (4), and 'or 
T'(d) fret (2), je'ds 
dEt,(r(9.'a),d] 
(10)  —  = t(:f;  (p12) (1—o(1+f)] ( U'(w]+U'(wAL]  ) rj.)) 
do 
—(p12)  t(1+f) ( U'[wjb'(wAL] ) 
When  rd(I)>O) 
the first  tent Is poslt4ve, wh41e the  last  tern is  regattve. 
Whether  expected btiltty rises or fa"s wt •andomness  deoends on rj.), 
tne 
responsiieness of repo—ted  4'come to raflGo.Press,  as g4ven  4n  ec..at4oc  (6;.  No 
simple  condit4on  or tS uti'ity  ',tct4on a—d paramete's wI'l guarartee  tnat 
utiflty  •4ses or fa'ls.  With constant aDso'ate  r4sk aversion,  ut1i4ty  nust 
fall, a'though with  decreasing  abso'ute '4sk aersion, .ti"ty may rise or fa". 
The exampie oelow,  in which  utiity  r15e5 with randorness,  has nonincreasing 
absolute risk aversion. 
When d increases,  consumptior wren  not audIted  must  decrease.  Suppose 
increased.  That is, suppose irT(d)—tr(') rose with d.  Then average  Income wnen 
a4ited must  fall, since expected tax payments net of transfers are  eld con— stant.  The average consu,otion wren acttc '5  Via a'erage of  and w.,. 
winch  's (mtTdj—tr'.,]  —t(lef)r  tGr)r(.. slrce t a  epon s-c..r°e tn 
d  ave—age income can fa" org  if  tie first  ten'  fa1s. cut that is a ccrta— 
diction. 
Thus,  wnen  t<rd. an 'nc-ease 4n arcena'rty idces a cecrease  'v tre 
;a, tetweer conswptioi dr  tr  taxpayer -s  iot radited ard  the ave"ags  - 
:wpton wre he  is audtted.  Tre  rer.al'iin; cjest'on s  whether ths  —ecit  c' 
'-  the gtp  can  ccnensate 'r  the  'rcreased va'ance 'n ccrumptn co':  :1c_al 
r  —udlt.  We  foilowi'g example snws V.t  t  May. 
! are:  prse  ;_esee_cas are ; ie' cy 
log w  wc  (1,.16:=6.C 
'11)  u(w 
:s (w —  9—J;  w  (1/.6)6.67 
'ris  utility function •s  c:rcaie, crt"t1ous, and exhb1ts nonincreasi  soc— 
uts risk aversion.  We take  m10. t  4, p.15. c2.  For  these vCues, ard .vnen 
: i5 less than 2, ircome i  'n the sarge of  decreasirg  aDsoiute r4s  aje'rrn 
49cr  the taxcayer  's  audited,  bt.t  is 'n  the  linear  cortion  o'  the  t'1'ty 
unctior wPe  no audit occu—s  The  Appercx cetonstates  ttat  t"is exa'np 
expected  utIlIty first rises with d,  and reacnes  a 'rar'tn at a value of 1.6. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
We first showed that the  optimal  tax  and  enforcement poflcy  requires some 
randomness in the  assessment  of taxable  ircome whenever reducing randorness 's 
16 costly.  This  is  true whetner  tne saded  toots are 'eoatec tg"  txeO. 
whether  a  ixeo amount of  revenue is maintaineo  oy reoucg  toe orjoac'' 
' ty 
audit when randomness  increases 
We  also  conside"ed  tne  optimal  amount  of  randomness  in  two second—best 
orob'ems;  that o  usirg  randomness  as an enforcement  oarameter,  when  the tax 
code and cires are fixed, arc tnat of using randomness to  enhance revenue when 
all  other  tax and enforcement  parameters  are  fixed,  in tne the enforcement 
prob1em,  it may or  may not be ootimal to  make  assessed taxable jrcone as random 
as possible.  Tn the second  oroblem,  taxpayers may  prefer  some randomress  n 
tax  assessment  when they  are rebated tne additional revenue cole:ted, etber 
d1rectly or tnrog' public goods tnat they va1e  at least as  mucn  as  the do'  'ars 
reouired to oroduce the puplsc goods. 
Thus,  risk aversion does not  recessari  ly 1mply that uncertainty  aoout the 
tax assessment s  su000tima1. 
One  implication  of this study  is that, if tne enforcement  agency maximizes 
net revenue, it will bade a offerent view o  rardomness  than  if it 'naxTh'izes 
taxpayers  expected utslity.  An interpretatlon  oc Proposition 
I  is t'at, if 
the  enforcement  agency maximizex  net revenue with  the tax code and al1owable 
fines fixed, more randomness is a1wayx petter.  But more randomness may or  may 
not e'nanoe expected ut''ity.  Siemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) snowed that a s4r.iiar 
oi'ference  arises  with  resoeot to tne  optimal enforoemert  oudget  wit'  no un- 
certainty  in assessed  taxable  income.  With  the tax code and a1lowaple  f1nes 
fixed,  an  erforcement  agency  that maximizes  net revenue wifl want a  larger 
enforcement  budget  than doex an  enforcement  agency  that  maximizes  expected 
utility.  Tnese divergences  suggest caution  in  interpreting enforcement mode's nat  assume  the  agency's  objectve s  to raxnica  re've'ue.  8enevolrt tax 
ocr  action agec'es may not ir fact cairce evenue, arc, 4nceed, sboo d Cot. 
Rather, the tax system ard enccemet  policy  s'culd me  choser jcrtj Sr  ax— 
m4ze :ocai welfare. 
In the srp'e  rodel we have stucied, toe criy sccal cost of evasion is the 
rcertainty '-  ccrsumption  that accompanies  it.  Tax avas4on may &so  ascrct 
no—i ccr,ta'  ard vr"tical  equity.2'  Vertica1 equity  cannot  be  studed  4r  or 
"ode'  since we  ave assumed a'  1  taxpaya"s have the same 4rcome.  Cne  ccr 
sicer  it hcrizcr,taily  Thecuitable  that acre taxpayers  get audted  arc "-et, 
wb'le others do rot  If these elenerts  a—a  introduced, 5oic:as that rcce 
tax  evasion  aa  nc—c  likely to appear  beref'cia'  'rom a scc4ai  we'fa—' oe—— 
osacti  ye. 
That  uncertainty  erhancea  evenue  has  recently  oeen  ccrrocorated  by 
ReThganum  and  'de (1987)  'o—  toe  case that  the taxpayer  s  urcertaY 
er4'crcement  costs  and therefore  urcertain  whether r1s tax debt j' be  ccl— 
1ected,  and  by Scotchmer  (1987b)  f0r the  case  that.  although auditors  wco1c 
ac—ce or taxacie income,  the  taxpayer is igroant of aspects o the tax law arc 
oust cncose  whether to reso've  uncertainty.  In this  paper,  we  have snown  rot 
orly that  rencomnean in assessed  taxable income  ennerces  revenue,  but that  some 
—andomness  is  optimal  from  the  point of view of social welfare, if randomness 
is  costly to reduce. 
''  Vertical  and rorizonta'  epuity are nacussed by Scotcnmer  (1987a). APPENDIX 
Proof o  ernma1:  At d0,  "(Q,p,t)n, arid  the value of  (4) is zero, since 
wAR=WAL=WNA 
and p1,(i+f).  It foiThws that the falue of (5), which is  less than 
the a'e  of (4), is negative.  S;nce WAR￿WNA for every  an  r, ano  since (5) 
has negative  value when  WAH=WhA, it must ce true that (5) has negative  value 
for WAR  and WNA close  to m(i—t); n  particular, when r is close to m and d s 
close to zero.  Thus, t  cannot occur  that m—d<r(d,p,t)<m+d or smai1 d, sce 
that woula  require (5) to have vaue greater tram or eoual to zero,  a  contra- 
diction. 
Hence,  for  close to  ze'o,  r(a,p,t)T—o.  We now show that r(d,o,t) carnot 
oe 1ess  than m—d.  Since U() exnthits  nonincreasing  absolute risk aversior, 
the thi'd  derivatve o  J(•) is posItive,  so the  marginal  utilty  J(.) ' 
convex.  Rence, (1_p)Ll[wNAJ 
+ pf [(/2)U[wAL] 
+ (i/2)U[w]] 
-(1-p)U[wNA]  +pf U'[(i/2)wA+(i/i)wAHJ  ￿  (to)  U'[wNA] 
+ pf UWNA 
= 
Te  latter equals zero cecause prl/(i+f).  Hence the value of (4) 4s positive, 
rather  than zero, wnch implies tnat r(d,p t)=rr—d for d sufficiently cose to 
zero.  Q.E.D. 
pie:  Since  p<i/(i+f), r(yn—d  for smali d.  We will  consider  such 
values  of .  The  parameters  have  Deem crosen  so  that 
NA s  in the domair where 
utility s  linear, wh'e  and WAR are rn the domain riere utlty Is toga— 
rithrnic.  The first—order condit4on  (4) ther becomes 
(p/2)f  (p/2)f 
(A-i)  -(-o)s  + 
m—t(m—d)—tf(m—d—r)+1  'ri-t(m-d)—tf(m+d—r)+T 'rovioed there is a solution to tris equation,  our hypotoeses stove are correct 
ond (A—i) oesoribes the ootiral r(T,b), since the—a is 0011 c_a  vsue  of " tha' 
saY  sf4es (4) or  (5).  We suppress one oarameters (ct)  the aspessior 
()  because  they stay fised  r  th4s  discussion. 
Soivirg (A—i) for r(.)  yielbs 
+ b°-4ao  T 
(A—2)  r(&)  = 
2a  tf 
where 
a  = 2ts(i—o)/p, 
2rr(-t(i+t))  b2-  a 
m-t(r-d)(lf)  m-t(m+d)(1+f) 
or  a—  + 
tf 
m(i-t(if))0  2 i  2  2m(i-t(i=f))  _________  + 
2  (tf) 
We have oisregarded  the os'a11'r  root of the quadratic equattr because 
is then negative and outside the domain.  One can see from this expressio  trat 
ar()  1+f  2  2  —0.5 
(4—3)  =  2ad ] 'b  — 4cc] 
ad  f 
which  is positive for positive d and equal to zero when d0. 
Ai,thougb  the representative  indivicual  takes  the  reoste  T  as  fixec,  in 
equilibrium  it must be that 
20 (A-4)  T(d)  =  t(1-p(1f))(c.o,t)  mpt(1) 
-  t(1-p(1+f))  r(0,0)  rnpt(l+)  3 
t(1-p(i+f))  (r(T(d)d)-r(0,0)) 
where  r(0,C) is  the report that would be made if d0 and T=0. 
Combining  (A—2)  and (A—4), we can express the equiDriurn 1eve of r() as 
a function f  d  as 
f  (ip(1F)) 
(A-5)  r(T(d),d)  [  X  +  r(0,0)  ] 
(1+f)(1-p)  f 
b+  4ac 
whee  X  = 
Then we can show tat 
3r(.)  2a0  1f  2  —0.5 
(A—6)  =  — r_  [o —4ac] 
>  3  if  d > 3 
3d  1—p  f 
In our  exampe,  m=13, t.4, p.15, f2  and s.15.  In this case, (A-5) =nd (4-6) 
reduce to 
(A-7)  r(.) = 428 + .576  (+415  d2)05 
(A-8)  3r(.)/3c  =  2.43 d (4+416 i2)05 
From (15), dEU(.)/dd  oecomes 
-.09+.1188 d  (4+4.16 d2)0  09.1188 d (4+4.16 d2)05 
(A-9) 
1.47-1.5  d ÷  735(4+416  d2)°°  1.47÷1.5 d ÷ .735(44.16 
At  d=0. dEU()/dd=Q,  but dEU()/dc is positve fo positive  d.  Expected uti'ty 
is maximzed when dl.6. 
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